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The General Secular Pattern
IN 1870, the initial year covered by this study, the regulated
industries were the giants of the American economy. It was in these
that the newly won technological wonders of the industrial revolution
found—and for the next two decades continued to find—their most
dramatic manifestations. To them, capital had been drawn from all
sectors of the nation, and continued to flow in very large quantities.
By 1870 the net value of the plant and equipment of the regulated
industries had reached $8 billion, measured in terms of 1929 prices.
This was somewhat more than the entire gross national product in
that year. In the following decade, the average annual gross flow
of capital to this segment of the economy, again figured at 1929
prices, exceeded $500 million. This was about 15 per cent of the
entire nation's annual gross investment in this period—an aggregate
which includes public as well as private construction, residential as
well as industrial building, and producers' durables purchased by
farms as well as by nonagricultural industries.
The principal components of the regulated group in 1870 were
the steam railroads and privately owned water transportation and
water supply. Of these, the railroads were the youngest and by far
the most important. They accounted for 85 per cent of the total
value of the plant and equipment of all regulated industries, and
more than 80 per cent of their gross capital formation, net capital
formation, and output.
Large as it was in 1870, the subsequent growth of the regulated
group was very substantial. The size of the railroads, as measured by
the constant dollar value of their road and equipment, increased
more than threefold in the years subsequent to 1870. Street and
electric railways by 1870 had made but a modest start with the
horsecar toward the elaborate network which reached, with the
application of electric power, almost every sector of the nation
just forty years later. The commercial beginnings of telephones and
electric light and power were not realized until the early 1880's.
Local bus lines, and a number of the industries we embrace in the
"all other" group, such as air transportation, motor trucking, radio
communication, and pipe lines, were developed in the main in the
period after World War I. This chapter focuses upon the growth of
the group as a whole, mindful that its several parts bear common as
well as many distinctive characteristics, as detailed in the following
chapter.
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An Over-All View, 1870—1950
Net capital formation, measured in constant dollars, represents net
additions to the physical stock of capital—within the statistical limits
described in the previous chapter. The uneven, gyrating pace of
growth in the facilities of the regulated industries, so measured, is
depicted by the broken line in the center panel of Chart 1. There is,
of course, no purely straightforward way to pierce the swift procession
of lofty peaks and cavernous troughs, so pronounced in this series,
for a glimpse of the longer-term trend. Even the nine-year moving
average, illustrated in the solid line of the center panel, leaves
cycles of great magnitude and duration—the long cycles to be
described in Chapter 7. Accordingly, several vantage points have
been taken.
The first of these is the tabulation of the annual average net
capital formation in regulated industries, for overlapping twenty-
year periods, as given in Table 1. These figures suggest a gradual
TABLE 1
Annual Average Capital Formation of All Regulated
Industries, by Twenty-Year Periods















Source: Appendix Table B—i.
rise from an annual rate of somewhat more than 400 million 1929
dollars in the first twenty years to a peak of 740 million in the period
19 10—29. Then there is a steady decline to a rate of less than 200
million in the final twenty years of the tabulation. The location of
the peak before or after World War I, however, remains uncertain
in this compilation. For net capital formation in the period 1900—19
is almost as great as in the period 19 10—29. Furthermore, a com-
parison of the post World War II peak with those in previous
periods is not possible within this framework.
Some further light is cast on these questions by the compilation
of Table 2. This presents nine-year averages of net capital formation
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TABLE 2
Annual Average Capital Formation of All Regulated
Industries in Nine-Year Periods, Selected Dates


























Source: Appendix Tables K—2 and K—4.
taken at selected dates at ten-year intervals. Here we discern a
gradual rise in net capital formation from about 270 million 1929
dollars per annum in the 1870's to a peak in the neighborhood of the
first fourteen years of the twentieth century, when investment
proceeded at a rate of $1 billion a year or more. From this point
onward the general drift of net capital formation was downward,
at least until the years following World War II. To be sure, another
peak is reached in the 1920's, about equal to that achieved around
1910, but it is apparent now that the high level of investment at the
later date is not so sustained as at the earlier one. Thus, the peak
nine-year average centered in 1926 of $1,130 million is preceded
by figures of less than 400 million for the nine-year averages centered
in 1920 and in 1916. It is followed, moreover, by an investment rate
of little more than 400 million in the nine years centered in 1930.
On the other hand, the 1910 peak of about 1,140 million 1929
dollars is preceded by a figure almost as large—nearly 1,000 million
—for the nine years centered in 1906.
Similar consideration may be brought to bear upon the evaluation
of the post-World War II peak, though here the picture—at least
as it appears in Table 2—is not so clear. In order to provide full
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consideration for the buoyant years following World War II, a
special estimate was compiled for net capital formation of the
regulated industries in the years 1951 through 1954, essentially
beyond the time span established for this study. It will be observed
that in the nine years centered in 1950 an additional investment
peak was achieved, materially greater than those of 1926 and 1910.
Here again, however, we may note that the peak is preceded by
years of unusually low investment, as the tabulation shows. Indeed
—to an even greater extent than in the 1920's—the huge post-
World War II capital flow represented in important degree a
process of recuperation from an extraordinarily severe and pro-
longed investment contraction. Nevertheless, itis apparent that
proper perspective, from a secular standpoint, can be obtained only
by taking explicit account of the long cycles which so clearly
dominate this series. The computations of Table 3 were designed
for this purpose.
TABLE 3
Annual Average Capital Formation of All Regulated
Industries during Long Cycles, Dated from
Nine-Year Moving Averages












a Measuredfrom trough to trough.
°Terminaldate of series rather than cyclical trough.
Source: Appendix Tables K—2 and K—4. Terminal years of cycles are weighted one-
half.
For this tabulation, cycles were marked off from the nine-year
moving averages, which succeed in smoothing the shorter fluctuations.
For the periods intervening successive troughs, the dates of which are
given in the first column, annual averages of the nine-year moving
averages of net capital formation were computed. Viewed in this
framework, the general growth pattern is more distinctly outlined.
The investment peak falls quite definitely in the earlier of the three
doubtful periods—that is, in the dating of Table 3, somewhere in
the span 1898—1918. This conclusion stands even when use is made
of the special estimates for the years after 1950. The average annual
net capital formation from the nine years centered in 1935 to the
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nine years centered in 1950 was 367 million 1929 dollars, 25 per cent
less than that of the 1918—35 period, and only half the rate pre-
vailing in 1898—1918. Thus, this approach suggests that the secular
peak in this series must be dated somewhere in the years preceding
World War I.
Consideration of all three tables together, however, impels a more
circumspect conclusion. It is true that placed against the broad
historical background, the buoyancy of the years following World
War II appears less dominating and impressive than it might other-
wise seem. Nevertheless capital formation reached heights in these
years well in excess of all previous levels. It is reasonably clear, at
least, that the secular trend since 1910 has not headed sharply
downward. On the other side, our analysis precludes the judgment
that the long-term movement was still heading sharply upward.
Beyond this it is difficult to go. Three possibilities must be admitted:
(1) that the long-term trend since 1910 was horizontal; (2) that it
was rising slightly; (3) that it was falling slightly. For brevity we
shall speak of the secular trend in net capital formation of the
regulated industries as being "virtually horizontal" since about 1910.
A somewhat different impression of the development of the
regulated industries is obtained from examination of the bottom
panel of Chart 1. Gross capital formation embraces the entire flow
of machines, buildings, and other capital equipment to the regulated
industries, including that required both for the maintenance of their
stock of plant and equipment as well as for expansion. It is thus the
total demand made upon the economy by the regulated industries
for capital goods, and is equal to net capital formation plus capital
consumption.
The gross flow of investment evidences no downward tendency
after World War I, or even a suggestion of a horizontal movement,
as was the case for net capital formation. The general drift of the
charted data appears distinctly upward. The figures of both Tables
1 and 3 show that the gross investment peak of the 1920's was
substantially larger than that of the immediate pre-Worid War I
period. And the data of Table 2, including the preliminary estimate
for the relevant years of the 1950's, show that the post-World War II
peak was, by a substantial margin, the greatest of all. In the nine
years centered in 1950, gross capital formation proceeded at the
annual rate of 3,690 million 1929 dollars, fully eight times the rate
which had prevailed in the 1870's.
Of course the difference between gross and net capital formation
is capital consumption. And the divergent behavior of the first two
implies the general trend of the last. Capital consumption rose from
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about 180 million 1929 dollars per annum in the 1870's to a rate of
nearly 1,800 million a year in the 1940's as shown in Table 4. In
the 1870's capital consumption was about half the size of net capital
formation. By the 1940's capital consumption had reached a rate
about three times as great as net capital formation.
This phenomenal increase is, of course, inevitable in a growing
industry.As long as net capital formation remains positive on
balance—that is, as long as the total stock of capital continues to
grow—capital consumption must increase. A logical exception—
though hardly of practical import—would occur if the economic life
TABLE 4
Annual Average Capital Consumption of All
Regulated Industries, by Decades











Source: Appendix Table B—i.
of new capital used for replacement and expansion were materially
expanded. And even this would arrest the advance of capital con-
sumption only for a limited time, unless the economic life of plant
and equipment was subject to indefinite and continuous extension.
Furthermore, barring the improbable exception noted above, the
expansion of capital consumption to a size greatly exceeding net
capital formation is also inevitable. For net capital formation is
bound—ultimately—to decline relative to the total stock of capital;
to maintain even a constant ratio it would have to increase (abso-
lutely) to infinitely high amounts. If the ratio of capital consumption
to the total stock of capital remains constant, increases, or declines
only modestly, capital consumption must sooner or later equal and
then exceed net capital formation. In the regulated industries as a
group, the period of equality was reached—roughly—in the 1890's.
And we have seen how rapidly after this date capital consumption
outstripped net capital formation. A special circumstance, however,
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accelerated this movement. This was the growth of new industries
such as telephones, electric light and power, trucking, local bus
lines, and air transportation, virtually all of which had higher rates
of capital consumption than the older giant of utilities, the railroads.
Thus, in the regulated industries as a group, the ratio of capital
consumption to the stock of capital increased rapidly. And in
absolute magnitude, capital consumption swiftly dwarfed net capital
formation.
The net result of the growth of the regulated industries is reflected
in the expanding volume of their total stock of plant and equipment,
depicted in the top panel of Chart 1. Physical capital exclusive of
land, and measured in 1929 dollars, aggregated about $8 billion in
1870; by 1889 it amounted to $16 billion, and by 1912—at $32
billion—it had doubled again. By the end of 1950 it was at a new
peak of 48 billion 1929 dollars. Net capital formation, discussed
above, is of course identical with changes in the volume of plant and
equipment; itmeasures, strictly speaking, the absolute rate of
growth. And it will be recalled that the trend of net capital formation
was approximately horizontal after 1910; when expressed as a ratio
to the stock of capital, therefore, it would be expected to decline.
In other words, the trend of net capital formation as described above
indicates that the relative rate of growth in the stock of capital must
have been retarded, at least after World War I. That indeed it was,
is shown directly by the data of Table 5.
Percentage changes in the stock of capital appear to reach a peak
in the ten or fifteen years prior to World War I. After this date they
decline swiftly. Even the post-World War II flurry of investment
fails to approach, on a relative scale, the previous peak. Furthermore,
prior to the pre-World War I high the rise is not nearly so steep,
when measured relatively, as it was in the absolute terms of net
capital formation. Indeed the percentage increases in the 1870's
and 1880's were but little below the peak rate reached in the decade
or so before World War I. Relatively, the growth of the entire stock
of plant and equipment of the regulated industries sloped slightly
upward from 1870 to about 1910, and declined sharply thereafter.
In contrast, the absolute rate of growth (net capital formation) had
advanced vigorously up to 1910, and leveled off in the neighborhood
of the peak in subsequent years.
In Table 6 the trend in the relative growth of the value of plant
and equipment, measured in constant dollars, is shown in a different
framework. Long cycle peaks were marked off in the nine-year
moving averages of the series, and average annual percentage changes
were computed for the intervening periods. Because of the great
16Source: Appendix Tables B-i; K-i, 2,4.
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Value of Plant and Equipment and Capital Formation, All Regulated
Industries, 1929 Dollars, I 870—i 951
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TABLE 5
Percentage Changes in Constant Dollar Value of Plant and
Equipment and of Output, All Regulated Industries
rears Per Cent rears Per Cent
Annual Average Percentage Increases in Constant Dollar Value of
Plant and Equipment, All Regulated Industries, during Long Cycles








Terminal date in nine-year moving average series.
Source: Appendix Table K—i.
length of the period between the first two peaks, the stage of slightly
rising percentage increases prior to 1910 is obscured in this table.
On the other hand, this framework presents a more concise summary
of the magnitude of the over-all decline in percentage increases.
For it is more clearly evident here that the trend is sharply downward,
from 3 per cent per annum between 1875 and 1914, to less than 2
18
AND EQUIPMENTa
1870—1880 38 1876—1886 34
1880—1890 38 1886—1896 35
1890—1900 27 1896—1906 23
1900—1910 43 1906—1916 42
1910—1920 15 1916—1926 13
1920—1930 29 1926—1936 8







1900—1910 100 1906—1916 72
1910—1920 57 1916—1926 36
1920—1930 16 1926—1936 0
1930—1940 51 1936—1946 119
1940—1950 65
OUTPUTb
Values as of the beginning of the year.
b Percentage changes were computed from the nine-year moving averages, except that
for 1950 the annual figure was used.
Source: Appendix Tables B—i and K—9.
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CHART2
Output and Changes in Output, All Regulated lndustries, 1929 Dollars,
1880—1950
Billions of 1929 dollars B;llions of 1929 dollars
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Source: Appendie Tables 1-1, 30; K-9,1l.
percent per annum between 1914 and 1931, and finally to a
fraction of one-tenth of 1 per cent between 1931 and 1947.
The striking thing about the production of the regulated industries
from 1870 to 1950 is the vigor of its rise. This is illustrated in the
upper panel of Chart 2. Measured in terms of 1929 dollars, it rose
from less than 1 billion in 1880 to more than 2 billion in 1897, to
more than 4 billion in 1905, to more than 8 billion in 1918, and to
nearly 17 billion in 1948. Nor'did the absolute rate of increase tend
to level off. This is illustrated indirectly by the general curvature of
the series depicted in the upper panel of the chart, for it rather
obviously heads upward at an ever-increasing pace. It is shown
directly in the lower panel in which year-to-year changes in output
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are plotted. Despite the highly erratic behavior of this series it is
apparent that the general trend is upward.
Moreover, though the general trend of relative increases in
output is downward, the decline is fairly modest, especially when
compared with the corresponding drop—at least after 1910—in
relative increases in the stock of plant and equipment previously
discussed. This is shown in Table 5. It should be noted that it was
possible to compile the series on output only back to 1880, in
contrast with the investment series which begin in 1870. Because
of the relatively volatile nature of output behavior, percentage
changes were computed from nine-year moving averages. Thus, the
1890—1900 output figure in Table 5 shows that from the average
of the nine years centered in 1890 to the average of the nine
years centered in 1900, output rose by 91 per cent. It may be
observed that the percentage increase from 1936—46 was very nearly
as great as the all-time high reached from 1896—1906. Nevertheless,
considering both columns of relative changes, and bearing in mind
also the cyclical nature of this series, it is apparent that the relative
rate of growth in output from 1880—1950 was moderately downward.
A Model Pattern
The considerations above suggest a familiar pattern of growth, to
which attention may be called at this point. Not only the totality of
all regulated industries, but also each of the selected individual
components, discussed in the next chapter, appear to conform—
at least roughly—to this pattern. For this reason it will be described
more fully than would otherwise have been necessary. For it must
be borne in mind that the regulated industries in the aggregate are
far from a homogeneous group, embracing as they do a wide
variety of functions. The application of a model to the behavior of
the totality, therefore, can at best be of descriptive utility only.
An ideal model of the pattern is illustrated in the solid lines of
Chart 3. The form of the curve in the upper panel of the chart is of
course similar to that employed frequently in the past to describe the
time path in the output of many mining and manufacturing
industries.' It is used here to depict the secular behavior of the
physical stock of reproducible capital as well as of output. It is com-
posed of the following "stages," of importance to our analysis: (1) it
initially rises by increasing amounts pr unit of time until it reaches
an inflexion point at A; (2) it continues to rise, but by diminishing
amounts, up to the peak at B; (3) it declines by increasing amounts
1Cf.Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870 (National Bureau












Model Pattern of Secular Growth in Industry
up totheinflexion point at C; (4) it continues to decline, but by
diminishing amounts, until it reaches zero at D.
The curve in the lower panel of the chart is designed to depict the
secular pattern of net capital formation or of changes in output, and
istherefore the derivative of the one above.It,too, contains
component stages of interest here. It rises at an increasing rate
until A', continues upward, but at a diminishing rate, until B'
(corresponding to point A in the upper curve); declines at an
increasing rate until zero is reached at C' (corresponding to B abpve),
declines at a diminishing rate until D' (corresponding to C above),
rises at an increasing rate to E' and at a diminishing rate until zero
is reached again at F' (corresponding to D above).
With this model as background, we may compare the behavior of
capital formation and of output in the aggregate of the regulated
industries. Throughout almost the entirety of the span of study the
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constant dollar value of plant and equipment rose at an increasing
rate. In terms of Chart 3, this means that the stock of capital had
riot yet passed point A in the upper panel. Net capital formation,
on the other hand, had shown fairly clear signs of leveling off.
Perhaps even before 1870, and certainly by not much later, net
capital formation had ceased to rise by increasing amounts over
time.2 The pace of its advance was distinctly retarded. In terms of
Chart 3, net capital formation had passed point A'. In the sense that
a rising tendency in investment has ceased to be pronounced,
secularly, we may say that the stock of capital of the regulated
industries was approaching point A, and that net capital formation
was drawing close to point B' in the model pattern. This implies,
too, that the secular trend in investment was at its highest point in
history at the close of our period of study, and may have still been
moving upward, though slowly.
The regulated industries as a group appear even more youthful
when viewed from the standpoint of their production. In terms of
the model diagram, the secular trend of output in 1950 had not yet
reached point A; but even more than this, the secular trend of
changes in output had yet to reach point A'. This means that the
long-term trend of output of the regulated industries moved upward
throughout the 1870—1950 span at an ever-expanding rate; and that
the changes in output also advanced at an increasing rate over this
period. Previously, we have shown that year-to-year percentage
changes in output have tended to decline moderately. We emphasize
here, however, that the absolute increments have continued to tend
upward—a fact which for some purposes is perhaps of more
significance. A more vigorous pattern of growth is barely possible in
an industry group which is among the oldest in the American
economy.
Significance of the Model
Observations made in the section on the model pattern are of
course consistent with the conclusions drawn in earlier pages from
an analysis of tabular materials. The pattern.served only as a des-
criptive device. In the following chapter it shall serve also as a
framework for ready appraisal and comparison of the several
individual regulated industries selected for separate study.
It may also be suggested, perhaps, that the growth model adds an
entirely new dimension to the analysis thus far undertaken. For
does it not imply something about both past and future? Should
2Amathematical curve approximating our model was fitted to the data, and suggested
a date for inflexion point A' at about 1875.
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not mathematical curves—empirical approximations of our model
—be fitted to the data and employed for predictive purposes of
interest? With reference to the period prior to 1870, fragmentary
evidence permits us to say that what such curves would imply,
broadly, is very likely true. Extrapolating them over future years
presents other problems. Past experience provides sufficient caution
against mechanical projections of this order. For economic history is
larded with mathematical patterns adhered to for a time and then
abruptly broken.3 The very nature of economic activity warns
against excessive confidence in a mere mathematical model. The
power of these warnings is increased manifold when, as in the
present case, the model applies to an aggregate of many industries
with a wide variety of heterogeneous characteristics. Until, or
unless, a model of this type can be supplemented with considerations
of another order—those referring to causal relationships and the
reasons for the behavior summarized—it must remain of descriptive
utility only. We should caution, in particular, that no assumption
can be made about the chronological duration of the various stages
of the model. Indeed, as the next chapter shows, these may vary
almost without limit.Hence their value for some mechanical scheme
for prediction is next to nothing.
In the broadest terms, however, some analytical justification may
be suggested now for the use of a model of this general type when
applied to more homogeneous groupings, as it is in the following
chapter. This stems from the expectation, on theoretical grounds as
well as on the basis of previous.studies,4 that the rate of growth of an
industry isultimately retarded. This idea—which is expanded in
Chapter 5—suggests a tendency for each of the regulated industries
to follow our model pattern of growth (or some similar version of it)
at least part way. The model is therefore illustrative of certain
observable uniformities of behavior. As such, it provides a useful
framework for the broader analysis of trends which is undertaken
later.
'Cf.Harold T. Davis, The Theory of Econometrics (Principia,1941), Chapter 11.
Numerous mathematical "laws" arc defined for industrial growth; virtually all have
since been flagrantly violated.
Burns, op. cii., and Simon Kuznets, Secular Trends in Production and Prices (Houghton
Mifflin, 1930).
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